Housing Subscription Points

Overview

Allocation of new Korean apartments in oversubscribed districts is decided by a points score, cheongyak gajeom, that sums three components to a maximum of 84. Years without homeownership contribute two points each up to 32; household dependants excluding the applicant earn five points as a base plus five per person up to 35; and the housing savings account contributes one point plus one per year up to 17. An applicant homeless for ten years, supporting two dependants and holding a savings account for eight years scores 20, 15 and 9 respectively, for a total of 44. Winning bids in central Seoul have repeatedly required scores in the high sixties, which is reachable only after roughly fifteen years of accumulation, and the design deliberately rewards long-tenured households with dependants over higher-income newcomers.

$$Points = H_{homeless} + F_{family} + S_{savings} \leq 84$$

Variables

Symbol Name Unit Description
$H$ Homeless period points points Two points per year without homeownership, capped at 32 points.
$F$ Dependant points points Five points plus five per household member excluding the applicant, capped at 35.
$S$ Savings account points points One point plus one per year of subscription savings tenure, capped at 17.

Rationing by Score, Not by Price

New-build apartments in South Korea are sold at a regulated price that usually sits below the resale market, so demand is rationed by a subscription score (청약가점) rather than by bidding. The score sums three components:

$$Points = H_{homeless} + F_{family} + S_{savings} \leq 84$$

The Three Components

Component Accrual Maximum Years to max
Homeless period 2 points per year 32 15
Dependants 5 base + 5 per member 35 6 members
Savings tenure 1 base + 1 per year 17 15

Dependants carry the heaviest weight for the least elapsed time: a household of six adds thirty-five points immediately, while fifteen years of continuous non-ownership are required for thirty-two.

Where the Threshold Sits

Because the components saturate, the practical ceiling for a single applicant with no dependants is 49 points — thirty-two plus one plus sixteen — regardless of how long they wait. Competitive Seoul developments regularly clear well above that figure, which is why the dependant component effectively determines eligibility for the most sought-after complexes.

Derivation & History

The point system replaced a lottery in 2007 after evidence that random allocation of below-market housing was capturing investors rather than first-time occupiers. Each component encodes a policy priority: the homeless period rewards households that have never owned, the dependant count directs larger units toward larger families, and the savings tenure requires demonstrated commitment through a dedicated subscription account. The 84-point ceiling is the arithmetic sum of the three caps rather than an independently chosen limit.

Worked Examples

Married applicant, two children, ten years without ownership

  1. Homeless period: 10 × 2 = 20 points (below the 32 cap)
  2. Dependants: 5 + 3 × 5 = 20 points (below the 35 cap)
  3. Savings tenure: 1 + 8 = 9 points (below the 17 cap)
  4. Total: 20 + 20 + 9

Result: 49 of a possible 84 points

Edge Cases & Limitations

Caps make additional years worthless: a sixteenth homeless year and a sixteenth savings year both add nothing, so an applicant who has saturated two components can only improve the score through household composition.

A single applicant cannot reach the top decile: with no dependants the arithmetic maximum is 49, below the winning scores at competitive Seoul developments.

Ownership at any point resets the homeless clock: the count measures the current unbroken period, not lifetime non-ownership.

Account tenure is continuous: closing and reopening a subscription savings account restarts the savings component from one point.

Real-World Applications

The score decides allocation in every point-based subscription round, so applicants calculate it before choosing which complex to apply for — a low score is better spent on a lottery-allocated unit than on a general-supply one. Housing policy debates use the same arithmetic when arguing that the dependant weighting disadvantages single-person households, now a large share of Korean urban residents.